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This paper analyses the economic and geographic characteristics of the world’s principal non-
sovereign territories in the context of the growth challenges facing small economies. These 
territories enjoy high degrees of policy autonomy within a complex array of relationship with 
their metropolitan countries. The territories’ distinct economic and geographic characteristics, 
notably small size and remoteness, have led to their adopting similar niche sectoral growth 
strategies to those of small sovereign states and a reliance upon tourism and financial 
services. In spite of the growth challenges faced, most of these territories have attained high 
levels of per capita gross national income (GNI), placing them in the World Bank High 
Income category. Global heating, economic crises and regional environmental shocks along 
with growing international protectionist sentiments however, raise critical questions 
regarding the continued viability of their traditional growth strategies, particularly their heavy 
reliance upon environmentally-harmful long-haul air travel and cruise tourism. This paper 
bridges the gap between large-scale growth studies, which generally overlook non-sovereign 
entities, and single case-studies to examine the determinants of the growth success of non-
sovereign territories and their future growth challenges given the pressing need for both 
economic and environmental sustainability. 
 
Key words: Non-sovereign territories; small economies; economic growth; sectoral 
specialisation; external exposure; tourism sector; financial services sector; environmental 
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The Non-Sovereign Territories: Economic & Environmental Challenges of Sectoral & 
Geographic Over-Specialisation in Tourism & Financial Services 
 
Introduction 
In addition to more than 200 sovereign states, the global economy is also home to a large 
group of non-sovereign territories. The latter entities are highly diverse, ranging from 
territories that are not sovereign in the UN sense, for which metropolitan powers have only a 
few residual responsibilities, to fully integrated regions – for example, the EU’s Outermost 
Regions (ORs) and the Dutch Caribbean special municipalities (bijzondere gemeenten). In 
between lies an array of territories with complex sets of relationships with their metropoles. 
The status of these entities remains the subject of debate; imperial ‘remnants of history’ 
awaiting their destiny of de-colonisation (Muller, 2000) or to be rebranded as full regional 
ORs (Kühnhardt, 2019). Relationships with their metropoles remain complex, with some 
territories pushing for ‘true equality’ yet still harbouring deep dissatisfaction and a desire for 
independence (Ferdinand et al., 2020). Seven of the ten metropolitan powers are European 
(i.e., Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK) and account 
for 38 of the 49 inhabited non-sovereign territories. A lively current policy debate relates to 
the extent to which the relationship between the territories of EU member states and the EU 
should be made more consistent and/or closer (Kühnhardt, 2019). This includes the possible 
formal designation of more territories as EU ORs – as in the case of Mayotte in 2014. This 
paper contributes to the wider debate by examining the economic and related environmental 
challenges facing non-sovereign territories – issues that have generally been neglected in the 
research literature. In recent decades, many of these territories have adopted the ‘traditional’ 
growth paradigm of many sovereign small economies focusing on niche activities in offshore 
finance and tourism as well as natural resources (Armstrong et al., 1998). The continued 
pursuit of such a growth strategy however, has reached a critical juncture given major 
challenges regarding the future economic and environmental sustainability of the two 
dominant sectors of activity. 
The non-sovereign territories have pursued niche sectoral growth strategies for their output 
and exports owing to their small size that differ greatly from those of most continental 
regions (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1998). In just over a decade however, many of them have 
experienced a series of devastating external shocks. The 2008 financial crisis triggered a 
major global economic recession, the impacts of which were particularly severe for small 
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entities because of its distinct sectoral – on tourism and financial services – and geographic 
effects – i.e., their reliance upon markets in Europe and North America (Armstrong and Read, 
2018, 2020a). Those with more diversified tourism sectors however, may have been better 
able to recover from the initial shock of the crisis (Podhorodecka, 2018). Prior to full 
recovery, entities in the Caribbean were struck by several destructive tropical cyclones in 
2017, with further adverse impacts on the region’s tourism sector in particular. The 2020 
Covid-19 ‘lock-down’ has brought international tourism to an almost complete standstill and 
is expected to trigger another deep recession. These events raise critical questions regarding 
the reliability of current growth strategies in many territories and, in particular, their 
continued reliance upon tourism. This paper analyses the growth challenges facing non-
sovereign territories, many of which are linked to European metropolitan powers, in the 
context of their principal economic and geographic characteristics.  
The bulk of the analysis focuses on 49 inhabited territories although the remaining 22 
uninhabited ones may also have a greater role to play in the future. They are of interest 
scientifically, particularly their rich biodiversity, and currently support a limited amount of 
fisheries exploitation. In the future, they are likely to offer greater Blue Economy 
opportunities (e.g. deep-sea mining) although their geopolitical status may become even more 
contested as strategic competition between major powers intensifies. For example, China’s 
Bridge and Belt Initiative has increased interest in and competition along the Arctic sea-
routes and China and the EU will have more opportunities to project ‘soft power’ and 
influence in previously uninhabited and low population regions Kuus (2020).  
This paper attempts to bridge the gap between large-scale studies that generally overlook 
entities such as the non-sovereign territories and the findings of single entity case-studies that 
are difficult to generalise. It first reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
distinctive economic strategies developed by small states and non-sovereign territories. The 
paper details the key geographic and other challenges facing the non-sovereign inhabited 
territories. Empirical evidence of the economic performance of the territories and their 
respective patterns of sectoral specialisation are then presented. The largely successful 
existing pattern of specialisation in non-sovereign territories – and the critically important 
portfolio of tourism market segments in particular – is argued to face serious economic and 





Growth Challenges for Small Economies 
Small economies – and the very smallest in particular – face a distinctive set of constraints on 
their economic growth. Early analyses highlight the interaction between small size, 
indivisibilities in output, efficiency and competitiveness (Scitovsky, 1960), such that 
increasing returns to scale necessitate specialisation which, in turn, determines domestic 
economic activity and exports. The import content of domestic consumption is therefore very 
high and must be financed through exports according to comparative advantage (Kuznets, 
1960). International trade therefore provides the means to extend their markets and attain 
greater scale economies, efficiency and competitiveness (Marcy, 1960) but increases 
exposure to exogenous economic shocks and protectionist actions by trade partners (Triffin, 
1960). The likely high unit costs of providing public goods through an inability to attain 
sufficient scale (e.g., defence, education, health and infrastructure) are also highlighted.  
Orthodox models of economic growth therefore have limited traction with respect to small 
economies. Large-scale labour-intensive industrialisation is predicated upon abundant low-
cost labour and a large domestic market, neither of which apply (Demas, 1965; Thomas, 
1982). Instead, small economies must necessarily specialise in a limited range of activities 
that are generally relatively scale neutral and/or more intensive in human capital (Bhaduri et 
al., 1982). Such specialisation however, means that limited resources are available for 
innovation and applying more advanced technologies (Briguglio, 1995; Katnic and Boskovic, 
2019).  
An alternative perspective views specialisation in small economies as ‘a strategic game 
theoretic process of self-selected hyper-specialisation’ (Bertram and Poirine, 2018, p. 209) or 
‘speciation’ (Baldacchino and Bertram, 2009) rather than the manifestation of comparative 
advantage. It is thus chosen autonomously rather than being imposed exogenously by 
inexorable global economic forces and is based primarily upon extracting economic rents on 
‘traditional’ assets, such as minerals and fisheries, as well as tourism assets (beaches, climate, 
etc.) (Bertram and Poirine, 2018) and geo-strategic location (Armstrong and Read, 2002). 
The outcome however, is the same regardless of the underlying determinants; namely 
excessive specialisation in a narrow range of export-earning activities.  
The patterns of specialisation first observed in small economies, particularly in small island 
developing states – SIDS, were based upon the key contributions of natural resources, 
financial services and tourism, together with migrant remittances (UNCTAD, 1997). 
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Although no such states are located in continental Europe, many non-sovereign territories of 
European countries do fall into this category (e.g., Montserrat and French Polynesia).  
Subsequent large-scale cross-country empirical growth studies find that the key determinants 
of greater per capita gross national income (GNI) – the World Bank equivalent of gross 
national product (GNP) – in small economies are openness to trade and niche sectoral 
specialisation. Those with dynamic tourism and/or offshore finance sectors (along with 
natural resources) significantly out-performed others reliant upon agriculture and 
manufacturing as well as aid and migrant remittances (Armstrong et al., 1998; Armstrong and 
Read, 2000, 2001; Read et al., 2012). The literature identifies several additional factors 
influencing the growth of small economies.  
Some 30 of the 43 sovereign states with populations less than 1.5 million are islands or 
archipelagos (69.8 per cent), rising to 75 out of 92 (81.5 per cent) if the 49 non-sovereign 
territories are included (World Bank, 2020). Much of the literature therefore focuses on small 
island economies although small size and islandness have separate and distinct challenges. 
Islands tend to experience higher transport and communication costs, particularly those that 
are more remote or isolated from major markets (Deidda, 2016), with knock-on effects on 
domestic efficiency and comparative advantage. Evidence on the adverse growth effects of 
islandness however, is weak (Armstrong and Read 2000, 2003, 2006; Read et al., 2012). This 
is not to say that islandness does not pose a challenge to growth but rather that many small 
islands have responded successfully to its challenges.  
The combination of islandness with small size has been argued to render small island states – 
and, by implication, non-sovereign small island territories – especially ‘vulnerable’ 
economically (Briguglio, 1995; Guillaumont, 2010). Bertram and Poirine (2018) however, 
argue that, since many small islands generally perform well, the inference that they are both 
‘resilient’ as well as ‘vulnerable’ is somewhat illogical. Further, by postulating that 
vulnerability and resilience are ‘opposite or independent variables’, Kelman (2020, p. 6) 
argues that this loses the full richness of the debate but also that this dichotomy ‘can slant 
discourses and reinforce stereotypes’. 
The reliance of small economies upon export-led growth highlights the critical importance of 
market accessibility and the impact of remoteness, strongly supported by empirical evidence 
of the benefits of proximity to major markets (Armstrong et al., 1998; Armstrong and Read, 
2006; Read et al. 2012). In addition, new growth theory suggests that economic growth has a 
7 
 
geographic dimension, leading supra-national organisations to develop specific policies to 
meet these challenges.  
The EU recognises a number of ‘geographical specificities’ – notably islands, mountainous 
regions and sparsely populated areas – as the basis for special policy packages (Carbone, 
2018; European Commission, 2020a). It also recognises remoteness from continental Europe 
through policies to support the ORs. Territories with low population densities (i.e., sparsely 
populated) present a range of economic challenges, including the higher cost of utilities and 
services which raise local business costs. Moreover, highly dispersed populations act as a 
serious barrier to industrial clustering. A tropical climate adversely affects labour and 
agricultural productivity owing to the prevalence of debilitating diseases and increases the 
risk of climatic disruption (e.g., Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs, 2001). Many tropical agricultural 
products are also argued to command systematically lower prices on global markets. 
A further important dimension is geographic export concentration (Ostlind, 1953); i.e., 
dependence upon very few export destinations. This increases exposure to imported demand 
shocks and greater growth volatility (Frankel and Rose, 1998), although these may be 
ameliorated by more synchronous business cycles with trade partners (Jansen et al., 2016). 
Many small economies continue to rely heavily on markets in their former/current metropoles 
(Bertram, 2004). This critical dependence upon export markets in the principal epicentres of 
Europe and the United States that was a primary factor in the transmission of the 2008 crisis 
to many small economies, over and above their sectoral structures (Armstrong and Read, 
2020a). 
Human capital is identified as a critical component in the comparative advantage of small 
economies yet many poorer and/or more remote entities have experienced substantial out-
migration. These have, in turn, become increasingly reliant upon inflows of remittances and 
foreign aid; e.g., MIRAB – migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy – economies 
(Bertram, 2006; Bertram and Watters, 1985). The loss of the most economically active, better 
educated and younger workers is common among such small economies (Docquier and 
Schiff, 2008), so weakening their economic and social structures while remittance flows 
typically tail-off over time (Poirine, 2006). Sustaining living standards therefore generates 
pressure for further out-migration and/or inflows of aid, which may create a culture of 
dependency. Although out-migration generally has negative effects on the home economy, 
previous emigrants may trigger quite large reverse tourism flows (Takahashi, 2019). In many 
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more prosperous small economies, including territories, significant levels of in-migration 
may occur, to help offset local labour supply constraints. 
Comparisons between small sovereign states and non-sovereign territories are undertaken 
only infrequently in the literature, often because the latter are generally regarded as 
extensions of their metropoles rather than having directly comparable characteristics and 
growth challenges. In terms of growth and incomes however, territories have out-performed 
small states even after normalising for metropolitan fiscal transfers (Armstrong and Read, 
2000). This phenomenon remains poorly understood but may encompass strong trade links 
with – and capacity to secure additional support from – their metropoles (Bertram, 2004) as 
well as better governance and institutions. Metropoles may act as ‘benevolent mainland 
patrons’ (Baldacchino, 2006) that provide a wide range of benefits, including political 
security, diplomatic representation and the freedom to travel, reside and work in the 
metropole (Clegg, 2018). In many cases, both territories and metropoles gain from this 
relationship (Sutton, 2013). These advantages are not absolute guarantees; benevolence may 
be reversed, as with stronger UK regulation of offshore finance centres and its negotiation for 
EU exit (Bosque, 2020; Clegg, 2018; Oliver, 2019).  
This economic disparity favouring non-sovereign territories may predate decolonisation 
(Bertram, 2015) and reflect differences between ‘settler’ and ‘extractive’ societies 
(Acemoglou et al., 2002) or the retention of territories with valuable resources and/or in 
strategic locations and decolonisation of weaker and more troublesome entities (Chai, 1998). 
The role of sovereignty remains poorly understood, primarily because most studies take a 
simple binary perspective whereas it may have many dimensions (e.g., economic, legislative, 
security, etc.) and is almost certainly more of a continuum than a dichotomy (Alberti and 
Goujon, 2020). Further, limited sovereignty in one dimension does not necessarily mean less 
in another (Grydehøj, 2020). More remote territories may also have exploited the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ to develop greater jurisdictional status and autonomy than those located closer to 
the metropole (Baldacchino, 2020). 
The economic growth literature identifies effective policy design and implementation as 
evidence of good governance. Small economies appear to be more flexible in pursing growth 
than larger entities in spite of having less scope for policy manoeuvre. Export-led growth in 
an era of liberal global trade has enabled many of them to prosper. In addition, they have 
been astute at free-riding and rent-seeking, engaging in niche regulatory strategies and 
opportunistic behaviour (Armstrong and Read, 2002; Baldacchino and Milne, 1999; Kakazu, 
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1995). High quality policy-making in many small states may also be attributed to governance 
and institutions that focus on ‘growth-promoting’ rather than ‘market-liberalising’ policies 
(Khan, 2007). They score highly in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI) (Briguglio, 
1995) and their unexpectedly strong growth performance may owe much to the quality of 
their governance (Congdon Fors, 2014; Read, 2018). 
Most small economies are islands, archipelagos or have coastal littorals (i.e., very few are 
landlocked). They are therefore especially susceptible to ecological, environmental and 
meteorological factors, including devastating natural catastrophes (Beller et al., 1990; 
Briguglio, 1995) – e.g., the 1995 Montserrat volcanic eruption – as well as the long-term 
effects of climate change. Their natural environments are also often very fragile owing to 
unique eco-systems and bio-diversities that are highly sensitive to environmental 
encroachment. Environmental vulnerability is therefore an additional growth challenge for 
small entities over and above exposure to external economic shocks and further amplifies 
their growth volatility. Many territories face major environmental vulnerability challenges; 
those in the Caribbean and Pacific regions are subject to severe hurricane and typhoon 
threats. Many are also volcanic islands, though not all have currently active volcanoes. 
 
The Non-Sovereign Territories 
This paper adopts a broad definition of non-sovereign territories and includes those in free 
association as well as the overseas territories of former European colonial powers (Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK). These are combined with six 
territories for which Australia and New Zealand have responsibility (three each) and the five 
unincorporated inhabited territories of the United States which are in free association but are 
not sovereign. To these are added all of the EU ORs because they are both geographically 
detached (and often remote) from their metropole and, more importantly, have distinctive 
economic policy autonomy. The UK Crown Dependencies of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of 
Man are included alongside the UK territories for the same reasons.  
The Antarctic territories are omitted because they have no permanent inhabitants and their 
exploitation is limited by international treaties. Hong Kong and Macau have a degree of 
economic autonomy but are effectively extensions of mainland China and are therefore 
excluded. The UK Overseas Territory of Akrotiri & Dhekelia is excluded since it comprises 
purely sovereign military base areas with no functioning economy.  
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In the full set, there are 71 territories, 22 of which are uninhabited. This paper focuses on the 
49 inhabited territories although the uninhabited territories may have an important role in 
future policies. 
 
Key Geographic Characteristics of Non-Sovereign Territories 
This section discusses the geographic characteristics that either pose critical growth 
challenges for small economies or else offer important growth opportunities. The principal 
defining characteristic of small economies is population size, which is the most 
comprehensively available measure. Two additional geographic size measures are also 
relevant; land area and ocean available for exploitation within the 200 nautical mile limit – 
i.e., the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
The land areas of the 49 non-sovereign territories are plotted against their populations in 
Figure 1 along with the global set of sovereign states. The UN size threshold of 1.5 million is 
used to distinguish between small and large sovereign states while those with populations 
below 100,000 in 2017 are also identified. The territories are very small; in terms of both 
their populations (as expected) and land areas but also relative to small states. Their median 
population was 55,620 (compared to 403,117 for small states) and median land area is 260 
km
2
 (compared to 1,815 km
2
). The territories therefore have more in common with those 
states with populations below 100,000 than either set of the other comparators. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Non-sovereign territories however, whether inhabited or uninhabited, are not small with 
regard to the size of their EEZs. The average of the former is 118,291 km
2
 – larger than that 
for either the small or large sovereign state groups (98,450 and 106,870 km
2
 respectively) – 
while that of the 22 uninhabited ones is even greater at 412,146 km
2
. France, the UK and the 
United States, in particular, possess significant numbers of uninhabited territories with 
extensive EEZs. 
The population and geographic size data have profound implications for the territories in that, 
while they face severe growth challenges, their large EEZs offer substantial potential growth 
opportunities from the ‘Blue Economy’ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2016; COGEA srl, 
2017; European Commission, 2019; World Bank, 2017). Although more traditional niche 
specialisation in coastal tourism and fisheries are being actively pursued, new Blue Economy 
niches (e.g., offshore energy, seabed mining) are still in their infancy. 
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Several other important geographical characteristics are detailed in Table 1. The first two 
columns show the extent to which the 49 inhabited territories are remote from key global 
markets. ‘Distglobe3’ is the great circle distance to the nearest of the three main global 
markets of East Asia (calculated using Beijing as the centroid), Western Europe (Brussels) 
and North America (the nearest of either Washington DC or Los Angeles). This measure 
typically has a highly significant negative statistical effect on economic performance 
(Armstrong and Read, 2000, 2006, 2020a; Read et al., 2012) and may account for half the 
difference in welfare between small island economies (McElroy and Lucas, 2014). 
‘Distmetrop’ measures the great circle distance to a territory’s metropole. This has a 
statistically significant positive effect since territories (and small states) tend to trade 
disproportionately with their current metropole or former colonial power (Bertram 2004). 
Ideally, a more nuanced measure of remoteness could be used, possibly based upon transport 
mode choice sets and transport link analysis (Karampela et al., 2014) but comprehensive 
global data of this type do not currently exist.  
[Table 1 here]  
The challenge of remoteness is more subtle than might be expected; European territories have 
much lower ‘Distglobe3’ values than those of Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 
In addition, the average value for the territories is ‘only’ 2,922 km, lower than those for either 
small or large states (4,035 km and 4,081 km respectively). The ‘Distmetrop’ average 
however, is substantially greater at 6,662 km – ‘distance to the metropole’ is not appropriate 
for sovereign states – and is a surprising finding given the extreme remoteness of some 
inhabited territories (e.g., Pitcairn Islands). The principal reason is an ‘historical accident of 
geography’; a disproportionate number of European territories are in the Caribbean and 
therefore relatively close to the large North American market but distant from their European 
metropoles. This accounts for the greater imbalance between ‘Distglobe3’ and ‘Distmetrop’ 
values for France, the Netherlands and the UK. The territories are therefore, on average, 
extremely remote from their metropoles but less so from the three major global markets. 
Nevertheless, an average ‘Distglobe3’ value of 2,922 km is hardly ‘accessible’ and lies at the 
upper end of ‘medium-haul’ air travel (Eurocontrol, 2018). Moreover, these average values 
hide large variations; a minority of inhabited territories are very remote from major global 
markets. The 22 uninhabited territories are, on average, much more remote than their 
inhabited counterparts – 8,234 km for ‘Distglobe3’ and 8,166 km for ‘Distmetrop’. 
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Of the other three important geographic characteristics, 92 per cent are islands or 
archipelagos and 65 per cent have a tropical or tropical maritime climate but none are 
landlocked. The challenges of islandness are therefore of particular significance to the 
inhabited territories, greatly exceeding those for small and large states. 
 
Economic Growth in Non-Sovereign Territories 
This section demonstrates that non-sovereign territories have been able to attain high levels 
of per capita income. To analyse this issue in an appropriate context however, it is necessary 
to outline the severe data issues encountered in any in-depth study of the territories. 
The analysis of small economies involves serious data deficiencies and this is even more 
severe for non-sovereign territories, so raising critical methodological issues. These problems 
are discussed at length elsewhere (e.g., Armstrong et al., 1998; Armstrong and Read, 2020a) 
but are summarised here. The principal global harmonised datasets all suffer from severe 
systematic truncation problems, particularly the exclusion of smaller economies (both 
sovereign and non-sovereign). These entities often lack the capacity and expertise to produce 
detailed harmonised statistics and, in the case of many territories, because they are not 
members of major international organisations (e.g., the UN, World Bank, WTO etc.). The 
resultant systematic dataset truncation poses major problems for statistical analyses such that 
any research must rely upon the available data and carefully qualify its findings. This study 
uses the principal global harmonised datasets wherever possible, supplemented by local non-
harmonised statistics. Two important features of the non-harmonised data however, render 
this exercise less heroic than it might appear. Many territories have improved the range of 
statistics collected and have begun to harmonise them more closely with international 
conventions. Their domestic economies also tend to be dominated by just two or three sectors 
such that better data are often collected specifically for these key sectors.  
In spite of very severe economic and geographic challenges, many small economies enjoyed 
considerable growth and income success prior to the 2008 global crisis. In addition, although 
non-sovereign territories are on average smaller, they appear to have out-performed sovereign 
states during this period (Armstrong and Read, 2000). ‘Best estimates’ of national income per 
capita for the 49 inhabited territories are provided in Table 2. The table demonstrates the 
difficulties in producing comparable statistics but also reveals clear results. The core data are 
the harmonised 2017 GNI per capita statistics from the World Development Indicators 
database (World Bank, 2019a), the most recent year for which the number of territories can 
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be maximised. It is sufficiently distant from the 2008 global crisis for most entities to have 
made an almost full recovery and is also prior to the Covid-19 pandemic ‘lockdown’. The 
particularly severe Caribbean hurricane season in 2017 however, is reflected in some 
statistics. The World Bank produces per capita GNI data in two forms; in current US Dollars 
at market exchange rates and broader ordinal data according to its four-fold income 
classification, which includes estimates for some territories excluded from the continuous 
dataset. The remaining data are the authors’ own best estimates, drawing upon local and 
sometimes regional statistics.  
[Table 2 here] 
The data sources, together with qualifications and ‘health warnings’, are given in Appendix 1. 
The most serious problem is that, while almost all non-sovereign territories now produce 
good GDP data, only one or two produce GNI or GNP data. Where GDP data are used, it is 
unclear whether or not it is greater than GNP or GNI data; i.e., the bias is not systematic, 
which would make interpretation much easier. Net factor income payments are particularly 
important for small economies; some territories receive large inflows of migrant remittances 
(sometimes obscured by higher imports), raising GNP relative to GDP, while major 
investments and assets are likely to be foreign-owned, raising GDP relative GNP. Non-
harmonised statistics are inherently less reliable such that conclusions can only be drawn 
where the differences between the two values are large. For this reason, the values are simply 
listed rather than averaged. 
The World Bank income classification provides the most comprehensive GNI per capita data 
for 23 territories, of which 22 are High Income (i.e., 95 per cent). Most non-harmonised 
values are also High Income (17 of 22 – i.e., 77.3 per cent) while four of the five Upper-
Middle Income territories lie close to its upper bound – American Samoa, Mayotte, 
Montserrat and St Helena & Dependencies – hence great caution should be exercised in 
drawing conclusions in these cases. No useable income data are available for Christmas 
Island and the Cocos Islands (Australia), Svalbard (Norway) and Pitcairn (UK). The evidence 
indicates that the European territories appear to have been the most successful of all, 
particularly those in the Caribbean. 
The data in Table 2 strongly supports the view that most non-sovereign territories have 
prospered under the traditional small economy growth model, especially those in the 
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Caribbean, irrespective of their metropole. The performance of some territories, principally 
those of the UK, has been outstanding – most of which are offshore finance centres.  
The most successful small economies are those specialising in some combination of 
international tourism, financial services and resource exploitation (Armstrong et al., 1998; 
Armstrong and Read, 2000, 2020a). Analysing niche sectoral specialisation in non-sovereign 
territories however, suffers from serious data deficiencies and requires extreme care in 
collating and interpreting statistics. Sectoral export data is highly desirable but rarely 
available and it is necessary instead to rely upon production data. The approach adopted is to: 
a) focus on those harmonised variables encompassing the most comprehensive set of 
territories; b) analyse the three key sectors before broadening out; and c) use non-harmonised 
data only where it can be suitably identified and with appropriately qualified conclusions. 
 
International Tourism 
Most small economies have developed important international tourism sectors, the growth of 
which has been facilitated by the increasing availability of low-cost long-haul flights and 
expansion of cruises. The critical importance of the sector to export earnings has led many to 
be described as small island tourism economies or SITEs (McElroy, 2006). A more recent 
classification reinforces the importance of tourism; four of the ten categories of small island 
economies identified by Bertram and Poirine (2018, Figure 9.17) incorporate tourism 
(‘tourism plus exports’; ‘moderate-impact tourism’; ‘high-impact tourism’; and ‘offshore 
finance plus tourism’). Tourism is also a critically important source of employment and has 
been central to growth strategies advocated by the IMF and other institutions (e.g., Bishop, 
2010; Hawkins and Mann, 2007). The sector remains critically important for both growth and 
living standards, including in less-developed small island economies (Puig-Cabrera and 
Foronda-Robles, 2019). Many citizens of SITEs however, are well aware of the trade-offs 
between tourism-based economic growth and its adverse environmental and other 
implications (Figueroa and Rotarou, 2016). While the exports of many small entities are 
dominated by tourism, most also undertake a range of other activities.  
The importance of tourism and its key market segments to non-sovereign territories are 
shown in Table 3. The proxy variable for average distance travelled is based upon the 
authors’ own calculations, drawing upon UNWTO data on the global region, sub-region and 
country of origin of tourists. Wherever possible, data refer solely to tourists rather than total 
visitors (‘tourists plus excursionists’ in UNWTO terminology) because these different types 
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of visitors have widely differing economic (spending) and, even more importantly, 
environmental impacts. This distinction is key to understanding the magnitude of the future 
challenges facing territories.  
[Table 3 here] 
The first two columns of the table indicate ‘tourism intensity’ in terms of expenditure and 
numbers of tourists per capita of the resident population. There is considerable variation in 
both measures; not all territories have dominant tourism sectors and cannot be realistically 
described as SITEs. Nevertheless, the final two rows of the table show that tourism intensity 
in most cases is significantly greater than the averages for both small (under 1.5 million) and 
large states.  
The ‘high tourism intensity’ territories – i.e., those with per capita resident averages well 
above the small state average ($1,501 expenditure and 1.1 tourists per capita) – appear to be 
of three types. The Caribbean – almost certainly including St Martin in spite of the lack of 
data – with the exception of Montserrat, Martinique and Puerto Rico, all of which 
nevertheless have significant tourism sectors; the Pacific, notably The Cook Islands, Guam 
and The Northern Mariana Islands; and a select ‘European’ group comprising The Canary 
Islands, Gibraltar and Madeira but not the Açores, Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man, in 
spite of the rapid growth of ‘cold water’ tourism in recent years. The data for the Açores and 
Madeira however, are significant underestimates since these exclude tourists from mainland 
Portugal. More remote territories – e.g., Greenland, Pitcairn Islands, St Helena & 
Dependencies and Tokelau – perhaps unsurprisingly appear to have struggled to develop 
strong tourism sectors. 
Cruise visitors per capita resident, including yacht visitors in many but not all cases, are 
shown in Column 3. This segment is dominated by the Caribbean and driven by the rapid 
expansion of the large North American market, facilitating within-sector diversification. 
Territories in the region with relatively fewer cruise visitors – e.g., Guadeloupe and 
Martinique – still have per capita values greater than or equal to the small state average. 
Outside the Caribbean, only The Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and Svalbard have relatively 
large cruise tourism segments. 
Data for ‘excursionists’ or day-trippers (Column 4) has many missing entries, which is 
unfortunate since this segment has the lowest carbon footprint, being both short-haul and 
using less-polluting modes of transport, particularly arrivals by land. Great care is therefore 
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needed in interpreting the data. Since most territories are islands, few have extensive 
potential day-trip niches and land arrivals are rarely large in number with the exception of 
Gibraltar. Several others have developed substantial day-trip niches, including Guernsey and 
Jersey (from the UK and France), Ceuta and Melilla (from Spain) and some Caribbean 
islands; Anguilla and (probably) St Martin.  
Two further characteristics stand out in Table 3. There is a very strong metropolitan bias 
within tourism flows (Column 5), particularly for Dutch, French and US territories. This bias 
is less strong for UK territories yet almost all have metropolitan shares in excess of the UK’s 
global population share (less than one per cent). As with trade in goods, disproportionately 
strong tourism links with metropoles may be the result of good transport links as well as 
shared language, culture and religion, all of which boost tourism flows significantly (Dropsy 
et al., 2020). Further, the average weighted great circle distance of tourist travel to territories 
and small states are broadly similar (Column 6) in spite of territories being predominantly 
islands, including some of the most remote communities on earth, and at a substantial 
distance from their metropoles. The distance averages however, are skewed downwards 
owing to the proximity of territories in the Caribbean to the largest market (North America). 
Average weighted distances are typically much greater for many others, notably French 
territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, although several are benefiting from growing 
markets in East Asia (e.g., Guam and Northern Mariana Islands) and Australasia (e.g., The 
Cook Islands, Niue and Norfolk Island). 
The growth effects of tourism comprise three principal elements: employment, export 
earnings and domestic multiplier effects on GDP. Domestic employment is often the most 
visible indication of tourism’s importance to host economies. Its average share of the labour 
force in small states ranges from 5 to 15 per cent but just 1.7 per cent in Puerto Rico, the only 
territory for which data are available (Armstrong and Read, 2020b, Table 1). Tourism may 
therefore provide a useful means to reduce low-skilled unemployment in small entities 
(Armstrong and Read, 1995). The share of tourism in export earnings in small economies 
averaged more than 60 per cent 2015-17, including Aruba 68.9 per cent, French Polynesia 
66.4 and Sint Maarten 73.2 (Armstrong and Read, 2020b, Table 1). The high dependence of 
many territories upon tourism however, exacerbates their exposure to external shocks (e.g., 
Covid-19). The sector’s contribution to growth is determined by its multiplier effects on the 
demand for local goods and services. This is especially problematic for small economies 
because of their narrow and shallow economic structures (Read, 2005) which mean that 
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‘leakages’ are likely to be large owing to high import dependence (Armstrong and Read, 
2020b). These growth effects may be greater in ‘traditional’ as opposed to enclave and/or all-
inclusive resort tourism (Mitchell and Ashley, 2010) and in more developed host economies 
(Meyer, 2007). The actual contribution of tourism to growth in the territories may therefore 
be very limited because it generates little local value added.  
The primary focus of this analysis is on the economic implications of tourism in non-
sovereign territories. This cannot be separated from the sector’s wider environmental impact 
however, which relates to both its effects on host economies but also, perhaps more 
importantly, its high per capita carbon footprint (Climate Scorecard, 2020; Gössling and 
Peeters, 2015). Gains from reducing this footprint through the adoption of more ‘sustainable’ 
tourism practices however, have been more than offset by the sector’s underlying growth 
(Lenzen et al., 2018). From a global perspective, the absolute impact of greenhouse gases and 
hence global heating from tourism’s per capita carbon footprint in territories is almost 
insignificant – i.e., a classic case of The Tragedy of the Commons. Given that many have few 
alternative sources of income, the easy option of pursuing tourism-led development is 
perhaps understandable. Nevertheless, the territories can and should address the wider 
environmental impacts of their activities. Global heating represents an existential threat such 
that it is ultimately in their own self-interest that they adopt mitigation policies. In practice, 
almost all are already actively developing more environmentally sustainable tourism. 
From Table 3, the territories have a distinctive portfolio of tourism sub-sectors with important 
implications for their wider environmental impact and therefore longer-term sustainability. 
Comparing the characteristics of this portfolio for the three ‘high intensity tourism’ groups of 
territories with those of small states highlights distinct adverse environmental implications. 
Tourism in the territories is predominantly overnight hotel accommodation-driven and hence 
has a high carbon footprint (Ewing-Chow, 2019). They are heavily reliant upon air links and 
also receive disproportionate numbers of cruise passenger arrivals, both of which have above 
average greenhouse gas emissions (Transport & Environment, 2019). The combination of 
islandness and remoteness means that few territories have been able to develop the less-
polluting day-trip segment using land transport modes (apart from Gibraltar) or short-haul sea 
and air transport (apart from Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man). A strong metropolitan 
bias is also evident in their principal tourism markets, generally increasing great circle 
distances travelled by air. Any credible policy strategy to reduce the environmental effects of 
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tourism must therefore necessarily substantially reduce the unsustainable carbon footprint of 
long-haul air travel and high emission cruise tourism.  
 
Financial Services, Resources and Manufacturing 
Data for other niche sectoral activities in non-sovereign territories are presented in Table 4.  
[Table 4 here] 
The role and importance of financial services is shown in Columns 1-4 of the table. The share 
of financial services – primarily financial intermediation (i.e., mainly banking and insurance) 
– in GDP is shown in Column 1. Column 2 shows the total share of services, public as well as 
private, which is considerably larger than for both small and large states. Whether a territory 
is an offshore finance centre (OFC) is indicated in Column 3, based upon the classifications 
of CORPNET (20017), Rose and Spiegel (2006) and Garcia-Bernardo et al., (2017). Several 
findings stand out. Some 22.4 per cent of territories possess an OFC compared with 30 per 
cent of small and 11 per cent of large states. Regardless of the sector’s importance, all 
territories have either adopted a hard currency or have a link at par or a fixed exchange rate 
peg (Column 4), reducing exchange rate risk for capital inflows and ensuring currency 
convertibility (Armstrong and Read, 1998) over and above any economic policy benefits. 
Apart from Curaçao, OFCs are found exclusively in UK territories and are all categorised as 
‘sink’ – i.e., locations where wealth is stored/lost – as opposed to ‘conduit’ operations – 
nodes in the flow of international capital (CORPNET, 2017). This is perhaps unsurprising 
given that London and Amsterdam are two of the world’s top five ‘conduit’ OFCs. The latter 
are defined as ‘attractive intermediate destinations in the routing of international investments 
... (which) … enable the transfer of capital without taxation’ (Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017, p. 
1) and are globally dominated by Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland and the 
UK. By contrast, ‘sink’ OFCs attract and hold capital, often in a non-transparent manner.  
An important challenge for territories with OFCs therefore is the regulatory and ethical issues 
relating tax evasion and avoidance, including money laundering. The OECD and the EU have 
initiated a series of measures, notably promoting transparency and the exchange of 
information for tax purposes (European Commission, 2013, 2020b; OECD, 1996, 2000). The 
G20 advocated ending banking secrecy in response to the global financial crisis given 
anticipated shortfalls in tax revenues needed for recovery. The role of OFCs is therefore 
likely to be increasingly constrained by further regulation of such capital flows. This may be 
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a slow and contested process since many OFCs have been set up in close collaboration 
between territories and their metropoles (Gravelle, 2014). 
Data for agriculture, forestry and fishing (including aquaculture) – AFF – in the territories is 
provide in Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4. Their shares in GDP are generally well below those 
for both small and large sovereign states (5.4 and 6.9 per cent respectively). A few are major 
producers and exporters of fish and aquaculture per capita (notably The Falkland Islands, The 
Faroe Islands and Greenland). Figures in brackets in Column 5 give the AFF share in GDP 
excluding fisheries and aquaculture (where possible) and indicate that it is not an important 
activity in most territories. The available data also suggests that the Pacific MIRAB 
territories, apart from Niue, do not possess large agriculture sectors, primarily because most 
of these activities are subsistence and not included in the GDP figures. 
The pattern of manufacturing in the territories is broadly similar to that of AFF (Table 4, 
Columns 7 and 8). Puerto Rico is the only major manufacturing centre, aided by its proximity 
and preferential access to the US/NAFTA markets. Every territory possesses some specialist 
manufacturing but, in most cases, these are not major export earners. The substantial 
merchandise exports for American Samoa are dominated by processed tuna from the largest 
cannery in the region. Aruba, Curaçao and Gibraltar appear to be significant manufacturing 
exporters but are all heavily involved in bunkering and re-exporting. This involves the 
supply, storage, loading and distribution of fuel for ships and aircraft. The only significant 
non-renewable natural resource exporter is New Caledonia (tin), although several other 
territories are currently engaged in oil-prospecting.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper provides an in-depth exploration of the geographic characteristics and economic 
structures of the world’s 49 principal inhabited non-sovereign territories. These entities are 
subject to similar growth constraints to sovereign small states but are distinct in terms of their 
very small populations, limited land areas and extensive EEZs. They have benefited from 
pursuing the same export-led growth strategies and adopting similar patterns of niche sectoral 
specialisation, notably in tourism and financial services, which have generated high per capita 
incomes. The European territories appear to have been particularly successful.  
The global financial crisis, the 2020 Covid-19 lockdown and a series of environmental shocks 
in the Caribbean have revealed fundamental weaknesses in this traditional growth paradigm; 
many territories now appear to be heavily over-exposed to external conditions. Most 
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relatively prosperous territories are highly specialised in a combination of financial services 
and tourism, both of which have been adversely affected by these shocks. Global heating also 
poses a significant challenge with its emphasis upon environmental rather than economic 
sustainability. The heavy dependence of territories upon tourism is based primarily upon 
medium- and long-haul air travel, given their remoteness combined with a continued reliance 
upon distant metropolitan markets. In the Caribbean in particular, this environmental 
challenge also encompasses cruise tourism. Offshore finance centres also face a critical 
challenge relating to international regulatory proposals to control or eliminate financial 
service activities associated with tax evasion.  
Extensive diversification is not a feasible option for the territories owing to their small size 
but policy moves to reduce over-specialisation and concomitant exposure to shocks are surely 
warranted, particularly to reduce the environmental footprint of tourism. There is therefore an 
urgent need for further agile ‘flexible specialisation’ (Baldacchino, 2019) to identify niche 
activities to replace tourism and offshore finance. New niches may emerge from within the 
Blue Economy as well as agriculture and manufacturing, limited examples of which already 
exist. These latter two niches typically exhibit high value low weight and/or enjoy 
phytosanitary (e.g., organic certification, non-GM), security (e.g. diamond cutting) and other 
advantageous characteristics. The current dominance of tourism and financial services may 
also have ‘crowded-out’ potential alternative activities by bidding-up domestic factor prices 
such that these effects might subsequently be reversed by limited diversification. 
Policies to promote new niches and greater environmental sustainability in the territories will 
need to be locally-led with sensitive involvement by the metropoles. Over-zealous ‘top-
down’ sustainability policies may have potential damaging economic and social effects, such 
as in Guadeloupe and Martinique (Rauzduel, 2020). Marginalising the voices of the territories 
together with constraints on local financing may be becoming particular problems where 
sustainability policies are being developed (Ferdinand, 2018; Robinson, 2018; Schwebel, 
2018). The struggle for territories to turn ‘their natural and socio-economic handicaps into 
assets’ will be hard (Gil, 2016, p. 5). As always, what is needed is an appropriate partnership 
between territory and metropole. 
The implementation of this fundamental change in strategy represents a major new growth 
challenge for non-sovereign territories. Many will be naturally uneasy about making such 
changes given the sustained success delivered by the traditional growth paradigm to date, 
their heavy dependence upon the existing patterns of sectoral specialisation and, in many 
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cases, the limited opportunities to diversify by developing new niche activities. This quest for 
greater future economic and environmental sustainability is critically important and new 
solutions need to be found and new relationships forged sooner rather than later. Tensions 
may arise from the ‘accident of geography’ that placed many territories closer to major global 
markets other than Europe, especially in the Caribbean, in spite of the strong economic and 
other ties with their metropolitan power. EU integration may also bring new strains for the 
territories, especially if the EU moves to a closer and more consistent policy with respect to 
the territories of its member states as some are proposing. Paradoxically, UK exit from the 
EU has created new tensions because of the number of territories involved, requiring new 
relationships to be developed.  
This paper focuses on the inhabited territories but the 22 uninhabited territories may have a 
greater role to play. At present they are mainly of interest in terms of scientific biodiversity 
and limited fisheries. Some also have a geopolitical dimension; e.g., the joint UK-US military 
bases on Ascension Island and Diego Garcia (British Indian Ocean Territory); the latter being 
the subject of legal dispute at the International Court of Justice. The increasing importance of 
emerging Blue Economy options in conjunction with geopolitical manoeuvring by major 
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Table 1: Geographic Characteristics of Inhabited Non-Sovereign Territories, 2017 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Metropolitan country Remoteness Remoteness Population Density Landlocked (%) Islands(%) Tropical/Tropical 
 ‘Distglobe3’ km ‘Distmetrop’ km (persons per km
2
)   Maritime (%) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia (3) 6,972 5,174 39 0 100 100 
 Denmark (2) 2,345 2,424 17 0 100 0 
 France (11) 4,485 7,078 286 0 91 91 
 Netherlands (6) 2,878 7,814 263 0 100 100 
 New Zealand (3) 7,195 3,314 38 0 100 100 
 Norway (1) 3,103 2,066 0.04 0 100 0 
 Portugal (2) 2,824 1,339 206 0 100 0 
 Spain (3) 1,837 576 4,485 0 33 0 
 UK (13) 2,165 6,647 164 0 92 46 
 USA (5) 2,530 9,553 299 0 100 100 
 All territories (49) 2,922 6,662 155  0 92 65 
 Small economies (47) 4,035 not applicable 159  13 68 68 
 Large economies (151) 4,081 not applicable 78  23 11  38 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 1. Figures in brackets are number of inhabited territories.  
2. Small economies are defined using the UN SIDS definition of under 1.5m persons.  
3. Median figures are used throughout because data sets are typically skewed and have severe outlier values.  
4. Ideally, measures of how ‘mountainous’ territories are would have also been included. This is a variable identified by the EU as being important. 
Unfortunately, harmonised comparable measures for ‘mountainous’ are not available. 
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Table 2: GNI/GDP per Capita of Non-Sovereign Territories, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Metropolitan Country & $US WB  Metropolitan Country & $US WB 
Territories    Territories 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Australia (3) 
  Christmas Island n/a n/a Norfolk Island 35,533 (4) 
  Cocos Islands n/a n/a  
 Denmark (2) 
  Faeroe Is 56,696 (4)  Greenland 50,714 (4) 
 France (11) 
  French Polynesia 19,746 (4)  Réunion 25,866 (4) 
  Guadeloupe 26,841 (4)  St Barthélemy 44,061 (4) 
  Guiane 18,902 (4)  St Martin 18,725 (4) 
  Martinique 27,889 (4)  St Pierre & Miquelon 44,947 (4) 
  Mayotte 10,581 (3)  Wallis & Futuna 10,938 (3) 
  New Caledonia 32,940 (4) 
 Netherlands (6) 
  Aruba 23,630 (4) Saba 23,383 (4) 
  Bonaire 22,316 (4) Sint Maarten 29,369 (4) 
  Curaçao 19,070 (4) St Eustatius 33,231 (4) 
 New Zealand (3) 
  Cook Islands 17,616  (4)  Tokelau 7,069 (3)  
  Niue 17,855 (4)  
 Norway (1) 
  Svalbard n/a n/a 
 Portugal (2) 
  Açores 18,904 (4)  Madeira 21,171 (4) 
 Spain (3) 
  Canary Islands 23,164 (4)  Melilla 20,202 (4) 
  Ceuta 22,025 (4) 
 United Kingdom (13) 
  Anguilla 18,751 (4)  Isle of Man 75,340 (4) 
  Bermuda 98,152 (4)  Jersey 50,353 (4) 
  British Virgin Islands 39,537 (4)  Montserrat 11,474 (3) 
  Cayman Islands 47,140 (4)  Pitcairn Islands n/a n/a 
  Falkland Islands 70,240 (4)  St Helena & Dependencies 11,980 (3) 
  Gibraltar 86,309 (4)  Turks & Caicos Islands 25,410 (4) 
  Guernsey 62,515 (4) 
 United States (5) 
  American Samoa 11,435 (3)  Puerto Rico 20,200 (4) 
  Guam 35,616 (4)  US Virgin Islands 36,292 (4) 
  Northern Mariana Islands 28,305 (4) 
 
 Small Economies ( <1.5m) average 13,576 40% = (4)  
  n = 47; n* = 0 
 Large Economies ( >1.5m) average 12,915 29% = (4) 
 n = 151; n*=0   
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: See Appendix 1.  
Notes:  Figures in bold type are from the World Bank and refer to 2017 unless stated. Those in italics 
and non-bold are from other (non-harmonised) sources and refer to GDP per capita.  
1, World Bank (WB) groups in 2017 were 1: <$995; 2: $995-$3,894; 3: $3,895-$12,054; 4: 
>$12,055.  
2. All figures refer to 2017, except: Cook Islands (2019); Falkland Islands (2016); Gibraltar 




Table 3: Key Tourism Segments, Metropolitan Market Share & Distance of Non-Sovereign Territories, 2017 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Metropolitan Country Tourism exp
1,2
 Overnight Cruise Passenger Day Trip Metropolitan Tourists  Weighted Great   
 p/c population ($US) Tourists Arrivals Arrivals Share (%) Circle (km)
3
 
  p/c population p/c population  p/c population 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia (3) 
  Christmas Island n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Prob LH 
  Cocos Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Prob LH 
  Norfolk Island n/a n/a 1.5 n/a n/a Prob MH 
 Denmark OATs (2)       
  Faeroe Islands n/a 2.1 n/a n/a 42.2 MH 
  Greenland n/a 1.7 0.7 n/a 51.1 LH 
 France (11)       
  French Polynesia 1,768 0.7 0.2 0.0 21.0 9,761 
  Guadeloupe 2,004 1.5 0.7 0.0 83.0 6,665 
  Guiane n/a 0.4 n/a n/a 71.0 5,704 
  Martinique 1,361 1.4 1.1 0.2 68.0 5,784 
  Mayotte n/a 0.3 0.01 n/a 57.3 LH 
  New Caledonia 571 0.4 1.8 0.0 31.3 9,298 
  Réunion 496 0.6 0.1 0.0 78.3 7,924 
  St Barthélemy n/a 33.3 9.7 n/a n/a MH 
  St Martin n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Prob MH 
  St Pierre & Miquelon n/a 1.5 1.1 n/a n/a MH 
  Wallis & Futuna n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a Prob LH 
 Netherlands (6)       
  Aruba 17,605 10.2 7.5 0.0 3.5 2,706 
  Bonaire n/a 6.7 21.2 n/a 34.0 LH 
  Curaçao 3,440 2.5 4.0 0.2 39.8 5,144 
  Saba n/a 4.2 6.0 n/a 16.0 MH 
  Sint Maarten 15,527 9.9 30.5 n/a 18.0 MH  




 New Zealand (3)       
  Cook Islands. 7,846 8.3 n/a n/a 66.7 3,457 
  Niue n/a 6.2 1.2 0.0 79.1 3,096 
  Tokelau n/a 0.1 n/a n/a n/a Prob MH 
 Norway (1)       
  Svalbard n/a 26.4 17.5 n/a n/a n/a 
 Portugal (2)       
  Açores
4
 1,677 1.4 0.4 n/a n/a MH 
  Madeira
4
 n/a 6.1 2.0 n/a n/a MH 
 Spain (3)       
  Canary Islands 8,786 7.4 1.0 n/a 10.4 MH 
  Ceuta n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a SH 
  Melilla n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a SH 
 United Kingdom (13)       
  Anguilla 9,643 4.5 0.2 5.3 4.8 2,656 
  Bermuda 8,031 4.2 6.5 0.0 8.5 1,791 
  British Virgin Islands 16,364 11.2  23.6 n/a 4.4 2,219 
  Cayman Islands 12,388 6.5 26.9 n/a 3.4 2,373 
  Falkland Islands 3,502 1.6 17.8 0.0 31.0 LH 
  Gibraltar 9,225 (7,066)  3.1 11.1 210.6 Strong UK MH 
  Guernsey 2,891 3.7 2.1 0.9 Strong UK SH 
  Isle of Man 1,663 3.1 0.1  0.03 Strong UK SH 
  Jersey 2,922 5.8 0.2 0.8 Strong UK SH 
  Montserrat 1,539 1.8 1.3 0.4 25.9 3,376 
  Pitcairn Islands n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a LH 
  St Helena & Dependencies n/a 0.7 0.3 0.0 UK & S Africa LH 
  Turks & Caicos Islands. 15,385 11.0 22.3 0.0 2.0 2,007 
 USA OATs (5)       
  American Samoa 396 0.4 0.4 0.0 23.7 2,875 
  Guam 10,652 9.4 0.0 n/a 5.0 3,473 
  Northern Mariana Islands n/a 11.6 0.1 0.0 3.9 3,362 
  Puerto Rico 1,157 1.1 n/a 0.4 92.2 2,453 
  US Virgin Islands 11,206 5.5 12.3 1.1 89.9 2,540 
 
 Small Economies  1,501 1.1 0.2 0.01 not appl. 3,239 
   n= 42; n* = 5 n = 45; n* = 2 n = 32; n* = 15 n = 28; n* = 19  n = 40; n* = 7 
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 Large Economies 166 0.3 0.0 0.03 not appl. 1,854 
   n = 122; n* = 29 n = 118; n* = 33 n = 73; n* = 78 n = 40; n* = 111  n = 103; n* = 48 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: See Appendix 2. 
Notes: Figures in bold are taken from the main harmonised global dataset published by the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). 
1. UNWTO conventions are visitors = tourists plus excursionists. Tourists = leisure trips, visits to family and friends, transit visitors and business visitors, 
all involving at least one overnight stay. Excursionists are visits not involving an overnight stay. They comprise cruise passengers (sometimes aggregated 
with yacht crews and passengers) and day-trip visitors.  
2. Expenditure figures have been adjusted to ensure as far as possible they refer only to tourist expenditures and not total visitors. In most cases they 
exclude ‘Passenger transport spending’ (i.e. pre-paid transport and some accommodation spending). This is appropriate for territories since most operators 
are located larger states and hence little money in this category accrues to the territory. The exceptions are Martinique, Réunion, Guam, Puerto Rico and the 
US Virgin Islands (where passenger transport spending is included) and British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Açores and Canary Islands where inclusion 
status is not known.  
3. Eurocontrol (2018) definition of haul length used: short-haul < 1,500km; medium-haul: 1,500-4,000km; long-haul:> 4,000km.  
4. Açores and Madeira tourism figures are a significant underestimate as date excludes tourists from mainland Portugal. 
 
Methodological note to Table 3: It is not always possible to produce a weighted average distance travelled to a particular territory owing to incomplete data collection or 
reporting such that selective re-aggregation is often undertaken in presenting the data. Several different variables were experimented with. The one shown in the table is the 
weighted average great circle distance travelled from the three largest World Bank global sub-regions, where the weights are the absolute number of tourists from a given 
origin. This methodology represents a compromise but incorporates the majority tourist flows (79 per cent) across the set of territories. Although the estimated genuine 
distances travelled, including any multi-leg and multi-mode journeys, would have been ideal, this data is not available. The centroids for the great circle distance estimates are 
the capital cities of the territories and origin. Since the origins are sub-regions, the capital city of the country sending the largest number of tourists is used. This is clearly a 
very crude proxy for the actual average distances travelled and must therefore be carefully qualified in any interpretation. For those territories for which no estimate could be 
made, non-harmonised country of origin data have been sought (see Annex 3) and a ‘guestimate’ made of the distance travelled by a majority of tourists according to the 
Eurocontrol (2019) definition (see note 3). In those cases with only very vague descriptions of origins (e.g., Pitcairn Islands) or where no data is available, ‘guesstimates’ are 
based upon the location of a territory and its access routes or else fragmentary information and indicated as ‘Prob’. 
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Table 4: Non-Tourism Sectoral Specialisation in Non-Sovereign Territories, 2017 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Metropolitan Country Financial All services/ OFC Currency AFF  Fish Prodn. Manuf./GDP Manuf. Exp. 
  Services/GDP GDP Share (%)   GDP Share (%) p/c (tonnes)
5 
 Share (%) p/c ($) 
  Share (%) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Australia (3) 
  Christmas Island n/a n/a No $AUS n/a n/a (0.000) n/a n/a 
  Cocos Islands n/a n/a No $AUS n/a n/a (0.000) n/a n/a 
  Norfolk Island n/a n/a No $AUS n/a n/a (0.000) n/a 1,514 
 Denmark (2) 
  Faroe Islands 3.0 64.1 No  par DKK 19.5 (0.2) 16.320 5.9 27,573 
  Greenland 11.5 63.7 No DKK 19.2 5.532 2.9 10,464 
 France (11) 
  French Polynesia 5.1 69.8 No peg € 5.0 0.052 n/a 589 
  Guadeloupe 3.2 71.0 No € 1.5 0.011 2.9 549 
  Guiane 2.3 70.0 No € 4.2 n/a (0.000) 7.3 550 
  Martinique 3.7 75.3 No € 2.0 0.011 4.3 590 
  Mayotte 1.6 66.3 No € 3.9 0.005 0.4 52 
  New Caledonia n/a 63.0 No peg € 2.0 0.018 13.0 5,605 
  Réunion 3.8 74.4 No € 1.2 0.003 4.0 478 
  St. Barthélemy n/a n/a No € n/a 0.014 n/a n/a 
  St. Martin n/a n/a No € n/a 0.003 n/a n/a 
  St. Pierre & Miquelon 5.0 80.2 No € 0.6 0.594 0.8 819 
  Wallis & Futuna n/a n/a No peg €  n/a 0.054 n/a n/a 
 Netherlands (6) 
  Aruba 7.4 78.4 Yes  peg $US 0.02 0.001 4.0 2,847 
  Bonaire n/a n/a No $US n/a 0.006 n/a 569 
  Curaçao n/a 81.4 Sink (8) peg $US 0.4 0.208 10.1 2,978 
  Saba n/a n/a No $US n/a 0.006 n/a 131 
  Sint Maarten n/a 88.8 No peg $US 0.1 0.006 0.8 132 
  Sint Eustatius n/a n/a No $US n/a 0.037 n/a 757 
 New Zealand (3) 
  Cook Islands 6.5 78.6 No Par $NZ 2.9 0.212 2.3 1,036 
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  Niue n/a 40.3 No $NZ 19.3 0.137 0.9 1,334 
  Tokelau n/a n/a No $NZ n/a 0.067 n/a n/a 
 Norway (1) 
  Svalbard 77.1 0.0 No NOK 0.0 n/a (0.111) 2.7 n/a 
 Portugal (2) 
  Açores 2.1 69.3 No € 7.5 n/a (0.000) 3.5 359 
  Madeira 2.8 75.9 No € 1.7 n/a (0.000) 2.6 601 
 Spain (3) 
  Canary Islands 2.5 77.9 No € 1.6 n/a (0.000) 2.8 1,907 
  Ceuta 1.9 81.0 No € 0.1 n/a  1.0 n/a 
  Melilla 1.9 81.4 No € 0.2 n/a 1.4 n/a 
 United Kingdom (13) 
  Anguilla 9.8 86.4 Sink (19) $EC 3.0 0.051 3.0 525 
  Bermuda 38.5 96.9 Sink (4) par $US 0.8 0.006 0.8 183 
  British Virgin Islands 24.6 90.3 Sink (1) $US 0.1 0.04 2.2 7,783 
  Cayman Islands 31.3 92.4 Sink (5) peg $US 0.4 0.002 0.9 521 
  Falkland Islands  1.6 31.0 No  par £ 61.6 (2.5) 19.867 0.7 (3,815)* 
  Gibraltar 30.0 100.0 Sink (18) par £ 0.0 0.000 0.0 6,378 
  Guernsey 40.4 92.4 Yes  par £ 0.4 n/a (0.000) 1.0 n/a 
  Isle of Man 31.5 91.9 Yes  par £ 0.4 n/a 2.2 n/a 
  Jersey 40.5 90.4 Sink (3) par £ 1.3 n/a (0.000) 1.1 n/a 
  Montserrat 6.9 90.2 No  EC$ 1.0 0.001 2.1 846 
  Pitcairn Islands n/a n/a No $NZ n/a 0.061 n/a n/a 
  St Helena & Dependencies n/a 87.6 No  par £ 1.0 0.141 7.6** n/a 
  Turks & Caicos Islands 8.1 90.2 Yes  $US 0.5 (0.2) 0.057 0.7 175 
 United States (5) 
  American Samoa n/a n/a No $US n/a 0.073 10.7 7,138 
  Guam n/a 54.0 No $US n/a 0.008 n/a 201 
  Northern Marianas Islands n/a 40.2 No $US 1.7 n/a (0.000) 1.1 124 
  Puerto Rico n/a 48.0 No $US 0.8 0.001 48.4 19,333 
  US Virgin Islands n/a 78.0 No $US 2.0 0.004 n/a 356 
 
 Small Economies  75.1 not app. 14 not app. 5.4 0.034 5.2 1,090 
   n= 41; n* = 6 (30%) n = 41; n* = 6 n = 46; n* = 1 n = 40; n* = 7 n = 41; n* = 6 
 Large Economies not app. 61.1 16 not app. 6.9 0.004 12.0 1,150 




Sources:  See Appendix 3. 
Notes:  In Column 5, figures in brackets are for AFF excluding fishing and aquaculture.  
1. Where possible percentage of GDP figures are GVA over GDP (WB convention).  
2. All conversions from local currencies to $US done at 2017 exchange rates.  
3. Figures in bold type are from WB or UN.  
4. The ‘OFC?’ column combines classifications of Offshore Finance Centres (OFCs) from two sources. The first is Rose & Spiegel (2007). This 
combines a list from three previous studies (Financial Stability Forum, 2000; Errico & Musalem, 1999; IMF, 2004). It is therefore more 
comprehensive than other lists compiled at that time. The second is a CORPNET (2017) classification based upon a much more empirical 
approach than previous classifications. This analyses the global system as a set financial links and nodes. The top 24 ‘sink’ OFC nodes are 
identified and ranked by their degree of centrality within the network. Those non-sovereign territories nodes are shown by the word ‘Sink’ in the 
column and their rank is shown in brackets. The CORPNET ‘conduit’ OFCs are all larger states and the five main ones are the UK, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Singapore and Switzerland.  
5. Fisheries production data are from UN FAO data base and include aquaculture production. Where FAO data are not available, fish catch data 
from University of British Columbia (UBC) have been used, shown in brackets in Column 6. The UBC data are greater values than the FAO data 




Figure 1: Population & Land Area of Non-Sovereign Territories & Sovereign States, 
2017 









































Appendix 1: Data Sources for Table 2 
1. Anguilla: Government of Anguilla.  
2. Bermuda: Government of Bermuda. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2016, $99,400.  
3. British Virgin Is: Government of BVI, GVA per capita at current market prices. CIA: GDP per capita 
(PPP) 2017, $34,200.  
4. Falkland Is: Government of Falkland Islands, GNI per capita. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2015, $70,800.  
5. Gibraltar: Government of Gibraltar. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2014, $61,700.  
6. Guernsey: States of Guernsey. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2014, $52,500.  
7. Jersey: States of Jersey. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2016, $56,600.  
8. Montserrat: Government of Montserrat. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2011, $34,000.  
9. St Helena: Government of St Helena, for St Helena only, omitting Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha. 
CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2009/10, $7,800.  
10. Faeroe Is: Statistics Faeroe Islands. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2014, $40,000.  
11. Greenland: Grønlands Statistik. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2015, $41,800.  
12. Bonaire: Netherlands Statistics (CBS). CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2017, $37,500.  
13. Curaçao. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2004, $15,000.  
14. Saba: Netherlands Statistics (CBS).  
15. Sint Maarten: Government of Sint Maarten. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2014, $66,800.  
16. St Eustatius: Netherlands Statistics (CBS).  
17. Açores, Madeira, Canary Islands, Ceuta & Melilla: Eurostat.  
18. French Polynesia: Comptes Ēconomiques Rapides pour l’Outre-Mer (CEROM). CIA: GDP per capita 
(PPP) 2015, $17,000 in 2015. Pacific Community: GDP per capita 2016, $18,231. 
19. Guadeloupe: Eurostat. CEROM, GDP per capita 2017, $26,116.  
20. Guiane: Eurostat. CEROM, GDP per capita 2017, $17,303.  
21. Martinique: Eurostat. CEROM: GDP per capita 2017, $26,157.  
22. Mayotte: CEROM. Eurostat: GDP per capita 2017, $13,152.  
23. New Caledonia: CEROM. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP), 2015 $31,100. Pacific Community: GDP per capita 
2016, $31,418.  
24. Réunion: Eurostat. CEROM: GDP per capita 2017, $24,253. 
25. St Barthélemy: IEDOM (Institut d’Ēmission des Départements d’Outre-Mer).  
26. St Martin: World Bank group for GNI per capita. CEROM: Dollar GDP per capita, 2015.  
27. St Pierre & Miquelon: World Bank. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2006, $46,200.  
28. Wallis & Futuna: PRISM (Secretariat of Pacific Community), 2015. IEOM: GDP per capita 2005, 
$11,412. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2004, $3,800.  
29. American Samoa: US Bureau of Economic Affairs. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2006 $11,200.  
30. Guam: US Bureau of Economic Affairs. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2016, $35,600. Pacific Community: 
GDP per capita 2016, $34,177.  
31. Northern Mariana Islands: US Bureau of Economic Affairs. CIA World Factbook: GDP per capita (PPP) 
2016, $24,500.  
32. US Virgin Islands: US Bureau of Economic Affairs. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 2006, $37,000.  
33. Cook Islands: Government of the Cook Islands, 2019. CIA: GDP per capita (PPP) 206, $16,700.  
34. Norfolk Island: KPMG (2019) GDP, 2016 - Gross Territorial Product at current prices, underestimate 
excludes Investment.  
35. Niue: Statistics Niue, GNI per capita. GDP per capita 2017, $16,048.  
36. Tokelau: Pacific Community, 2016. 
 
Appendix 2: Data Sources for Table 3 
1. Anguilla: UNWTO (tourism) and World Bank (population). Cruise visitors include yacht arrivals.  
2. Bermuda: UNWTO/World Bank. Cruise figures exclude yacht arrivals but these know to be small.  
3. British Virgin Islands: UNWTO/World Bank. Expenditure data 2015. Population, BVI Government 
statistics. Cruise figure 2016.  
4. Cayman Islands: UNWTO/World Bank.  
5. Falkland Islands: Government of the Falkland Islands data. Expenditure includes cruise passengers. 
Population, 2016 (Census).  
6. Gibraltar: Government of Gibraltar. Figure in brackets is spending by excursionists (mainly Spanish day-
trip visitors). Day-trip adjusted to exclude land arrivals crossing from Spain to work in Gibraltar. 
Overnight tourists not identified separately. Tourists figure derived from air arrivals ‘staying in Gibraltar’ 
and excludes ‘in transit’ air arrivals. Some of the latter stay over but most do not. Some land arrivals are 
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not day trip excursionists but also stay-over. Figure must be regarded as an underestimate of overnight 
tourism. Distance based on data on country of residence air departures, 2017 (overwhelmingly British).  
7. Guernsey: States of Guernsey. Expenditure data, 2019. Cruise figure includes yacht arrivals. Distance 
based on 2017 origin countries of all visitors.  
8. Isle of Man: Isle of Man Government statistics. Expenditure excludes cruise and yacht visitors but includes 
day-trip visitors (very small). Cruise figure 2018. Yacht arrivals not included. Distance based on countries 
of visitors (mostly British and Irish).  
9. Jersey: States of Jersey. Expenditure figure includes cruise and day-trip visitors (small part of the total 
only). Yacht arrivals included within cruise figure. Distance based on countries of 2017 visitors 
(overwhelmingly British and French).  
10. Montserrat: UNWTO/World Bank.  
11. Pitcairn: Distance (LH) is a guesstimate based on location and sea routes.  
12.  St Helena & Dependencies: St Helena government data. All figures are solely for St Helena. No tourism 
data collected for Ascension Island and Tristan da Cunha. Distance (LH) based on residence of 2017 air 
and sea arrivals (excluding cruise, yachts and returning St Helenians) – overwhelmingly British and South 
African.  
13. Turks & Caicos Islands: UNWTO/World Bank. Yacht arrivals not included in cruise figure.  
14. Faeroe Islands: Tourists per capita approximate, Nordic Council of Ministers (2019), ‘approximately 
100,000 annual visitors (2017)’. Distance based on origin residence for guest nights and not tourist 
numbers (Faroe Islands Statistics).  
15. Greenland: Government of Greenland, Visit Greenland (2019). ‘Tourists’ are ‘land-based tourism’ based 
on numbers of foreign air passenger arrivals. Cruise passengers identified separately. Day-trip arrivals not 
identified but likely to be small. Distance based on Visit Greenland (2019) for 2017 nationality of flight 
passenger arrivals (excluding Greenlanders).  
16. Aruba: UNWTO/World Bank.  
17. Bonaire: CBS, 2017. ‘Tourists’ are ‘tourist air arrivals’. Cruise passengers exclude yacht arrivals. No data 
for day-trippers (probably small). Distance based on CBS nationality data of tourist air arrivals, 2017.  
18. Curaçao: UNWTO/World Bank.  
18. Saba: CBS, 2017. ‘Tourists’ are ‘tourist air arrivals’. Cruise passengers are ‘sea and yacht’ arrivals’ 
described as ‘mostly tourists’. No data for day-trippers (probably small). Distance based on CBS 
nationality data of tourist air arrivals, 2017. 
19. Sint Maarten: UNWTO/World Bank. Distance is guesstimate based on figures for nearby islands.  
20. Sint Eustatius: CBS 2017. Figures are for ‘tourist air arrivals’. No data for cruise, yacht or day-trip arrivals. 
Distance based on CBS nationality data of tourist air arrivals, 2017.  
21. Svalbard: Visit Svalbard. ‘Tourists’ comprise number of guests in all accommodation, including camping. 
Cruise passengers 2018 from Visit Svalbard and AECO study 2019. Figure comprises only ‘conventional 
cruise’ passengers and excludes ‘expedition cruise’ passengers.  
22. Açores: Servicio Regional de Estatística dos Açores (SREA) (2016). Figure for tourists is a significant 
underestimate as it excludes those from the Portuguese mainland. Figure for ‘cruise tourists per capita’ 
refer to all ‘excursionists’ but cruise tourism predominates over day-trip tourists. Distance based on SREA 
data on countries of origin, 2016.  
23. Madeira: Direçāo Região de Estatística da Madeira, 2018, including Porto Santa. Figure for tourists is 
underestimate as it excludes those from the Portuguese mainland. Figure for ‘cruise tourists per capita’ 
refer to all ‘excursionists’ but cruise tourism predominates over day-trip tourists. Distance based on 
Direçāo data on country of residence of tourists, 2016.  
24. Canary Islands: Gobierno das Islas Canarias, Tourism numbers include visitors from Spanish mainland. 
Distance is a guesstimate based on location and other Atlantic ORs.  
25. Ceuta: Distance is a guesstimate based on location and access routes.  
26. Melilla: Distance is a guesstimate based on location and access routes. 
 27. French Polynesia: UNWTO/World Bank 2017, except expenditure 2016. 
 28. Guadeloupe: UNWTO/World Bank. Expenditure data 2018 are for all visitors and not just tourists. 
Distance is country of residence of overnight tourists, 2015.  
29. French Guiane: UNWTO/World Bank.  
30. Martinique: UNWTO/World Bank.  
31. Mayotte: IEDOM (2018). Distance based on IEDOM origins of tourists.  
32. New Caledonia: UNWTO/World Bank.  
33. Réunion: UNWTO/World Bank.  
34. St. Barthélemy: IEDOM. Cruise visitor numbers include yacht passenger and crew arrivals. Distance based 
on IEDOM showing origins of tourists.  
35. St Martin: Distance is a guesstimate based on Sint Maarten figures.  
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36. St Pierre & Miquelon: IEDOM. Day-trip visitors not separately identified. Distance based on IEDOM 
origins of visitors.  
37. Wallis & Futuna: Government statistics note tourism is ‘marginal’. Distance is a guesstimate based on 
location and access routes.  
38. American Samoa: UNWTO/World Bank.  
39. Guam: UNWTO/World Bank, data except expenditure Tourism Economics (2018) for 2016. 
40. Northern Mariana Islands: UNWTO/World Bank.  
41. Puerto Rico: UNWTO/World Bank.  
45. US Virgin Islands: UNWTO/World Bank.  
46. Christmas Islands, Cocos Islands: Distance are guesstimates based on location and access routes.  
47. Norfolk Island: Cruise tourism numbers from Norfolk Island government. No data for tourists. Total 
visitors (including returning local residents and day trippers, but not cruise tourists) 28,400 in 2017 
(KPMG, 2019), equivalent to 16.2 per capita. Distance is guesstimate based on location and access routes.  
48. Cook Islands: UNWTO/World Bank.  
49. Niue: UNWTO/World Bank.  
50. Tokelau: PRISM-Pacific Community. Includes excursionists as well as tourists. Distance is a guesstimate 
based on location and access routes.  
 
Appendix 3: Data Sources for Table 4 
1. Anguilla: Government of Anguilla, 2019 Budget. Data for 2017. AFF, manufacturing and financial 
services percentages of GVA at constant prices. CIA: merchandise exports (2017 estimate) over nominal 
GDP (Government of Anguilla data). Financial services, financial intermediation (i.e., banks & other 
financial, insurance & pension funds, and ‘auxiliary activities to financial intermediation’). CIA: all 
services as percentage of GDP.  
2. Bermuda: Government of Bermuda, national accounts. Exports, UN COMTRADE/GDP at current market 
prices. ‘Financial services’, financial intermediation (banking and insurance) plus ‘international business 
activities’ (‘financial activities’ plus insurance management, plus insurance risk taking including 
underwriting, brokerage and re-insurance).  
3. British Virgin Islands: Government of BVI, national accounts. CIA: exports (2017 estimate) over GDP 
current market prices. ‘Financial services’ are ‘finance & insurance’ GVA/GDP current market prices.  
4. Cayman Islands: World Bank and Government of Cayman Islands. Merchandise exports, UN 
COMTRADE/GDP. Financial services, ‘finance & insurance’ GVA as percentage of GDP current prices.  
5. Falkland Islands: Government of Falkland Islands, national accounts 2008-2017. AFF and manufacturing 
percentages of GVA at current market prices. AFF figure excluding fishing shown in brackets. Value of 
exports, wool and lamb/mutton only (i.e., excluding fishing). Exports/GVA. ‘All services’ and ‘financial 
services‘ are percentages of total GVA at current market prices. Financial services, ‘finance and insurance 
activities’ and are percentage of total GVA.  
6.  Gibraltar. Government of Gibraltar. No sectoral breakdown given (most recent for 2012). For AFF and 
manufacturing, CIA 2016. Exports Government of Gibraltar for 2016. GDP total for 2016/17 financial 
year. Exports mostly re-exports, excluding petroleum re-exports. CIA: ‘all services’ and ‘financial 
services’ (2016 estimates). Financial services, very rough estimate only.  
7. Guernsey: States of Guernsey, national accounts bulletins. No export data available: CDs export included 
in UK Office for National Statistics data, not separately identified. Financial services broadly defined as 
‘finance’ in the accounts.  
8. Isle of Man: Government of Isle of Man, national accounts 2017/18 financial year. Figures GVA/GDP. No 
export data available – included in UK figures. Financial services comprise banking, insurance and ‘other 
financial and business services’ (of which banking & insurance together comprised 23.6%).  
9. Jersey: States of Jersey, national accounts 2017/18 financial year. No export data as CD exports- included 
in UK figures. No detailed breakdown of financial services given.  
10. Montserrat: Government of Montserrat, statistics. Merchandise exports, CIA (2017 estimate) and exports/ 
GDP at current market prices (UN). ‘All services’ and ‘financial services’ are GVA/GDP at constant 
prices. Financial services, defined as financial intermediation (i.e. banking, insurance and ‘auxiliary 
activities to financial intermediation’).  
11. Pitcairn Islands: No useable data available.  
12. St Helena & Dependencies: Government of St Helena, for St Helena only, 2017/18 financial year. Figures 
for GVA/GDP at current prices. No data for manufacturing alone hence ‘industry’ data (includes 
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, water and sanitation, but excludes construction). No sectoral 
breakdown of GDP for financial services. Likely to be very small.  
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13. Turks & Caicos Islands: AFF figure in brackets excludes fishing. Exports value, WTO expressed over 
GDP at current prices, Government of Turks & Caicos. ‘All services’, World Bank, GVA/GDP. ‘Financial 
services’, Government of Turks & Caicos, 2017. ‘Financial services’ are ‘financial intermediation’ (i.e., 
banking, insurance and ‘auxiliary financial intermediation’).  
14. Faeroe Islands: World Bank and Statistics Faeroe Islands (Hagstova Føroya). AFF are a small 
overestimate, includes mining & quarrying bur dominated by fishing & aquaculture. Excluding fishing in 
brackets. ‘Financial services’ are ‘financial intermediation, including insurance and pension funding’.  
15. Greenland: World Bank and Statbank Greenland. AFF is a small underestimate as ‘agriculture’ is omitted 
data refer to ‘fishing and hunting’. ‘Financial services’ are ‘finance and business services’.  
16. Aruba: World Bank and Aruba Central Bureau of Statistics. AFF includes mining and quarrying. 
Merchandise exports 2016 from World Bank. ‘Financial services’ comprise ‘financial and insurance’. 
17. Bonaire: CBS Statline.  
18. Curaçao: World Bank.  
19. Saba: CBS Statline.  
20. Sint Maarten: World Bank, including merchandise exports 2016. Sint Maarten, Government Department of 
Statistics, GDP 2016.  
21. Sint Eustatius: CBS Statline.  
22. Svalbard: Statistics Norway (Statistiks Sentralbyrå), 2017. GDP share figures are percentages of GVA. No 
fish processing allowed until recently. Fish catches reported as part of Norway total only.  
23. Açores: Eurostat, GVA and GDP. SREA, Merchandise exports 2017. ‘Financial services’ comprise 
‘finance and insurance’.  
24. Madeira: Eurostat, GVA and GDP. Direçao Regional de Estatística da Madeira, merchandise exports, 
2017. ‘Financial services’ comprise ‘finance and insurance’.  
25. Canary Islands: Eurostat, GVA and GDP, 2017. Gobierno de Canarias, merchandise exports , 2017. 
‘Financial services’ comprise ‘finance and insurance’.  
26. Ceuta &Melilla: Eurostat, 2017.  
27. French Polynesia: Institute of Statistics French Polynesia (ISPF) and CEROM, 2016. ‘Financial services’ 
comprise ‘finance plus insurance’.  
28. Guadeloupe: Eurostat, GVA/GDP, 2016. IEDOM, merchandise exports, 2017. ‘Financial services’ 
comprise ‘finance plus insurance’.  
29. French Guiane: Eurostat, GVA/GDP, 2016. IEDO, merchandise exports, 2017. ‘Financial services’ 
comprise ‘finance plus insurance’.  
30. Martinique: Eurostat, GVA/GDP, 2016. IEDOM, merchandise exports, 2017 (excludes petroleum 
products). ‘Financial services’ comprise ‘finance plus insurance’. 
31. Mayotte: Eurostat, GVA/GDP, 2016. IEDOM-Mayotte, merchandise exports, 2017. ‘Financial services’ 
comprise ‘finance plus insurance’.  
32. New Caledonia: CEROM-New Caledonia, 2017. Figures are shares of total GVA not GDP. World Bank, 
exports.  
33. Réunion: Eurostat, GVA/GDP, 2016. CEROM-Réunion, exports, 2017. Financial services, 2016. 
‘Financial services’ comprise ‘finance plus insurance’.  
34. St Barthélemy: No GDP data. FAO, fisheries statistics.  
36. St Martin: No GDP data. FAO, fisheries statistics.  
35. St Pierre & Miquelon: IEDOM-St Pierre et Miquelon (2020), GDP, 2015. IEDOM exports, 2017.  
36. Wallis & Futuna: IEOM (2019) ‘les exports sont quasi inexistantes’.  
37. American Samoa: US Bureau of Economic Affairs, manufacturing GVA/GDP, 2017. World Bank, 
merchandise exports.  
38. Guam: World Bank, 2017.  
39. Northern Mariana Islands: CIA, GVA/GDP for AFF, 2016. US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
manufacturing GVA/GDP, 2017. World Bank, merchandise exports, 2017. CIA, GVA/GDP ‘all services’, 
2016.  
40. Puerto Rico: World Bank, GDP, 2017. US Bureau of Economic Analysis, goods exports, 2017.  
41. US Virgin Islands: CIA, GVA/GDP, 2012. US Bureau of Economic Analysis, exports, 2017 (excluding re-
exports of hydrocarbon products).  
42. Christmas Island & Cocos Islands: No GDP or export data. seaaroundus.org, fisheries.  
43. Norfolk Island: KPMG (2019), merchandise exports.  
44. Cook Islands: Government of Cook Islands, 2017.  
45. Niue: Government of Niue, 2017.  
46. Tokelau: No GDP data. FAO, fisheries.  
 
